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Abstract 
Among the determinants of the growth and convergence processes identified by the 
theoretical literature, human capital is certainly one of the most important. This paper 
offers a selective survey of the more recent contributions of the theory of human capital 
and growth. In particular, our aim is to provide the necessary link between the theory on 
growth, convergence and human capital and the empirics of convergence. Summarising 
with a play on words, we might conclude that during the last fifteen years there has been 
a convergence of ideas between endogenous and exogenous models with respect to the 
convergence hypothesis where human capital plays an important role. Despite the still 
theoretically important difference between models that assume exogenous versus models 
that assume endogenous long-run growth rates, both theories predict that a mechanism 
of convergence is possible, but it will only be so among similar economies. In particular, 
most theoretical literature assumes that similar levels of human capital are fundamental 
for catch up to take place. Therefore, both theories are currently able to explain a stylised 
fact of the empirical literature on growth, namely the observed convergence among 
groups of homogeneous countries and the absence of convergence when large and 
heterogeneous data sets are introduced. This observation explains why, with current 
econometric techniques, it is not possible to discriminate endogenous versus exogenous 
models by simply using a convergence regression. 
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“Knowledge and skills are the product 
of investments and combined with 
other investments account for the 
productive superiority of the technically 
advanced countries. To omit them in 
studying economic growth is like trying 
to explain soviet ideology without 
Marx.” Shultz (1962). 
1 Introduction 
Growth theory has been an active area of research during the last ten 
years due to the development of the endogenous growth literature1. In 
particular, the theoretical contributions developed by Romer (1986) and 
Lucas (1988) on endogenous growth have stimulated a resurgence of 
interest in this field. The debate that followed focused on theoretical and 
empirical aspects alike. From the point of view of theory, endogenous 
growth models appeared to be, or rather were simply presented by their 
authors as being “new” developments of the growth literature; new with 
respect to the “old” and still unmodified Solow-type growth model. 
Nevertheless, these models have their roots within the neoclassical 
solovian growth model. Given the availability in the mid 1980s of large 
international data sets with comparable GDP measures, these theoretical 
developments were soon followed by numerous empirical studies 
focusing primarily on one of the most important implications of the 
Solow growth model: the convergence hypothesis. By ascribing 
economic growth to the joint impact of exogenous technological change 
and capital deepening on an economy with concave short run production 
opportunities, the neoclassical solovian model makes very strong 
predictions concerning the behaviour of economies over time. In 
particular, the Solow (1956) growth model was initially interpreted as 
predicting that poorer countries should be catching up with the richer 
ones. This hypothesis is called in the literature the absolute convergence 
hypothesis.  
Conversely, early endogenous growth models stress the presence 
of persistent differences in per capita income across countries: rich 
                                                 
1 For a complete survey of the early literature on growth starting from Harrod (1939) to 
the mid 60s contributions see Hahn and Matthews (1964). 
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economies may retain a constant gap with poorer regions or may even 
increase it. Theoretically, these models emphasise mechanisms which 
generate divergence across economies. Therefore, estimating the 
convergence equation has become increasingly popular as the 
convergence hypothesis appeared to be a sort of acid test to discriminate 
between endogenous and exogenous theories. In other words, the 
convergence test was considered as the main empirical test of the validity 
of these modern theories of economic growth and this is why, at first, a 
lot of efforts have been devoted to trying to estimate the presence of a 
convergence/divergence mechanism across different economic areas.  
In general, stylised facts derived from international data sets 
showed the absolute convergence prediction to be untrue2. 
Nevertheless, the debate did not conclude in favour of endogenous 
models for various reasons. First of all, it has been demonstrated that the 
Solow model predicts conditional convergence. That is, roughly speaking, it 
predicts that only economies with similar fundamentals (preferences, 
technology as well as institutions, economic structure etc.) actually 
converge towards the same level of long-run output per person. 
Moreover, recent endogenous growth models predict the possibility of 
convergence across economies. In particular, models that stress both the 
importance of technology in explaining long-run growth and the 
possibility of transfer of technology among different countries predict 
that countries lagging behind may catch up towards the more advanced 
areas.3  
In particular, recent models focus on technology as the driving 
force for long run growth and on human capital as one of its main 
determinants. This is not to say that the role of human capital for growth 
was neglected by economists prior to 19864. From its earliest beginnings, 
economic theory has stressed the importance of human capital as a key 
factor for explaining growth. In general, human capital should indicate 
the degree of ability of the labour force and is usually measured in terms 
                                                 
2 See Barro (1991). 
3 Recent empirical evidence shows that the evolution of technology represents an 
important element in observed convergence among OECD countries. An interesting 
reading on the convergence hypothesis debate can be found in the “Controversy” of 
the Economic Journal (vol. 106, 1996) that includes papers by Durlauf, Sala-i-Martin, 
Bernard and Jones, Quah and Galor.  
4 Romer’s (1986) model is considered as the first endogenous growth model.  
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of formal education levels or on the job training. Accordingly, 
investment in human capital entails investment (education, training…) 
geared to sustaining and developing the ability of individuals. The 
accumulation of human capital is costly (it subtracts time available to 
production) but it represents a remunerative investment. Arrow (1961) 
together with the works of Schultz (1962), Uzawa (1965), Nelson and 
Phelps (1966) are probably the most important early contributions to the 
theory of human capital and growth. Although Arrow (1961) does not 
explicitly introduce human capital in his study, his model does include 
externalities linked to the process of the accumulation of physical capital. 
It is a learning by doing model where the larger the scale of production, 
the greater the increase of the labour force’s on-the-job productivity. We 
find a different approach in both Shultz (1962) and Uzawa (1965), where 
human capital is explicitly introduced in their analysis and is not 
considered as a mere by-product of production.  
In this Paper we introduce old and new neoclassical models that 
stress the importance of human capital and focus exclusively on what the 
different models predict in terms of the convergence hypothesis. As we 
shall see, different models imply different concepts of convergence. 
Therefore, it is important to stress how convergence has been differently 
defined and understood. Thus, our aim is to investigate the role human 
capital plays in the various growth models and to examine specifically the 
predictions of different models with regard to the convergence 
hypothesis5.  
In order to classify the different models we follow Aghion and 
Howitt (1998) and distinguish two different approaches that analyse the 
link between growth and education: the Lucas approach and the Nelson 
and Phelps approach. In the following sections we shall see that these 
two approaches include both endogenous and exogenous models. What 
distinguishes the different models is the assumed relationship between 
human capital and growth. What mainly characterises the Lucas 
approach is the assumption that human capital enters a growth model 
simply as an additional input in a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function and that capital accumulation is central force in generating 
growth. In other words, all these models imply there is a positive 
correlation between human capital accumulation and (long or short-run) 
                                                 
5 Other important recent contributions not included in this survey are, for example, 
Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) and Benabou (1996). 
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growth rates. Therefore, empirically, we should observe that countries 
with different rates of investment in human capital grow at different 
rates. Conversely, the Nelson and Phelps approach does not emphasize 
the role of capital accumulation (both physical and human) as an engine of 
growth and stresses the importance of the process of technological 
change. Within this framework, human capital is a prerequisite for 
economic growth where “the growth rate of output will depend on the 
rate of innovation as well as on the level of human capital”6. Thus, (long 
or short-run) growth rates depend on stocks rather than on rates of 
accumulation of human capital.  
Finally, while models reviewed above describe a catch up 
mechanism resulting from technology transfers with human capital levels 
acting as the main determinant, they do not describe any mechanisms 
that may affect the existence of transfers of technology among countries. 
In this survey we focus on models that identify trade policies as the main 
determinant of technology diffusion.  
This Paper may be divided into ten different parts. The next 
three sections briefly reviews how the concept of convergence has 
evolved in the literature on growth. We define the solovian convergence 
equation and introduce the notion of conditional convergence, while 
section four is dedicated to the early development of endogenous growth 
literature and to the divergence hypothesis. In section 5 we discuss the 
main points and predictions of the so-called Lucas approach, and the 
following three sections examine respectively a second class of models 
whose roots lie in the contribution of Nelson and Phelps (1966) 
(sections six and seven) and models that stress the importance of trade 
for technology transfers and catching up (section eight). The final part of 
this paper (sections nine and ten) is dedicated to a summary of the 
different concepts of convergence encountered during the survey and a 
classification of the theoretical models examined in terms of their ability 
to explain observed convergence or divergence, stressing the role that 
human capital plays in determining either one or the other result. 
2 The Solow model and the convergence hypothesis: 
absolute convergence 
In the Solow model, capital deepening is at the heart of the growth 
                                                 
6 Nelson and Phelps (1966). 
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process. The aim of the model is to explain the link between savings and 
growth, where savings are exogenous. This link is the process of capital 
accumulation. The model describes an economy in which the production 
function of the representative producer is )AL,K(FY = , where Y is 
the flow of output, K is the stock of capital, L is the labour force and A 
is knowledge or, in general, “effectiveness of labour”. Note that A and L 
enter multiplicatively, in which case technology is known as labour 
augmenting or Harrod-neutral. Both population growth and technological 
progress are exogenous. It is assumed that F( . ) exhibits positive and 
diminishing marginal products in each input, as well as constant returns 
to scale. The assumption of constant returns enables us to work with the 
production function in intensive form: 
 
αk)k(fy ==       (1) 
 
where 0 1α< < and, henceforth, the lowercase letters denote a quantity 
per unit of effective labour, with Kk AL= , and Yy AL= . Output 
can be used for investment or consumption. If depreciation of capital is 
proportional at rate δ , and a constant proportion of income, s, is 
invested in this economy, the derivative of k with respect to time evolves 
in accordance with: 
 
k sf k n g k
.
( ) ( )= − + + δ      (2) 
  
Equation (2) is the resource constraint, where n is the exogenous growth 
rate of the labour force and g is the exogenous technology (or 
knowledge) growth rate. The exogenous growth rate of the labour force 
can be considered as being a depreciation rate because it represents the 
fraction of resources that we need to pass on to the new generation. We 
can rearrange equation (2) to obtain the growth rate of k as: 
 
.
(1 )/ ( ) / ( ) ( )k k sf k k n g sk n gαδ δ− −= − + + = − + +  (3) 
 
If we consider a log-linear approximation of equation (3) around the 
steady state we obtain: 
 
k k d k dt k k
.
*/ [ln( )] / [ln( / )]= ≅ −β    (4) 
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where 
 
)gn)(1( δαβ ++−=      (5) 
 
That is, β  determines the speed of convergence from k 
towards its steady state level, k*7. In general, when a country or region 
starts with k below its level of steady state we should observe positive 
net investment, which implies positive growth of the stock of capital. If 
we focus on the development of a single country over time, the model 
predicts that the growth rate will be high when capital per worker is low 
and will decline as capital per worker rises. This is due to the fact that a 
low value of capital per worker implies a high marginal product of capital 
and therefore a high interest rate and a high level of investment. 
Therefore, we should observe that the real interest rate declines along 
with capital marginal product as an economy develops. This movement 
to higher values of k continues as long as k<k*, where k* is the steady 
state level of capital. Once the capital stock gets to k=k*, net investment 
becomes zero and k no longer changes over time.  
In brief, the Solow model has many important implications. 
First of all, savings rates do not affect the long-run growth of per capita 
income. The crucial factor explaining the presence of a sustained long-
run growth rate in an economy is the presence of exogenous 
technological progress. However, the savings rate affects the long-run 
level of per capita income. In particular, the Solow model predicts that 
economies converge to a steady state, where the key force that underlies 
the convergence effect is diminishing returns to reproducible capital; the 
process toward the steady state is called transitional dynamics. The 
steady state growth rate explained by the model is equal to zero; it is only 
possible to obtain continued growth in output per head if there is 
exogenous technical progress.  
                                                 
7 A more complex definition of the beta parameter is found when we assume savings to 
be determined by optimal choices of consumption over time. When the utility function 
takes the standard isoelastic form, it can be shown that the beta-convergence 
parameter becomes: 
2 1/ 212 ( ) ( ) 4 ( ) ( ) ( ){ ( ) [ ]}n n n g n g n gαβ ρ ρ ρ δ ρ δ α δαϑ
−= − − − + + + + + + + − + + I
n this case a higher θ  (reduced willingness to substitute intertemporally) lowers the 
speed of adjustment towards the steady state, while a higher time-preference rate, ρ , 
raises it. 
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Moreover, assuming certain assumptions are satisfied, the 
process of convergence towards the long-run equilibrium (within 
country convergence) may result in a tendency towards convergence in 
per capita income among economies. Note that given the Cobb-Douglas 
production function we assumed, 1( )Y K ALα α−= , the growth rate of 
(Y/AL) has the same form as equation (4):  
 
)]yln()y[ln(dt/)]y[ln(dy/y *
. −−≅= β   (6) 
 
or 
ù 
*ln ( ) ln (0) (1 )(ln ln (0))ty t y e y yβ−− = − −    (6’) 
 
Equation (6’) represents the convergence equation introduced in 
empirical studies. This equation indicates that when an economy starts 
from a level of income in efficiency units lower than its steady state level, 
we should observe a positive rate of growth of y where β , as before, 
represents the speed of adjustment towards y*. Thus, there should be a 
force that promotes convergence in levels of per capita income. 
Empirically, we should observe that the per capita growth rate tends to 
be inversely related to the starting level of output per person. This 
implication of the solovian model is referred to as the absolute or 
unconditional convergence hypothesis. 
 
3 Conditional convergence and the role of human capital 
We have seen that countries would converge in the absolute 
sense if the only difference between them is the initial level of per capita 
income. One of the most convincing arguments in endogenous growth 
literature against the Solow model was that the latter cannot account for 
international differences in income8, since there is no evidence of 
international convergence. However, there are two possibilities for 
reconciling evidence based on convergence, using the Solow model.  
Firstly, equation (5) shows that one of the key force underlying 
the convergence effect is diminishing returns to reproducible capital. In 
other words, the extent of these diminishing returns, that is, the size of 
the capital-share coefficient α  in the production function, has a strong 
                                                 
8 See Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). 
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effect on β . In particular, it has been shown9 that for small values of 
α , diminishing returns set in rapidly, β  is large and convergence is 
rapid. As α  approaches unity, the convergence becomes less and less 
rapid and, when α =1, diminishing returns to capital disappear, β  
tends to zero and we do not observe convergence. Thus, for values of α  close to one the transitional dynamic turns out to take a long time: as 
shown by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), if we see the transitional 
dynamics as protracted, the model becomes potentially capable of 
explaining sustained cross-country differences in growth rates, thus 
providing a Solow-type explanation of these differences. Large values of α  are usually explained by the introduction in the production function 
of a broad concept of capital that includes human capital. Secondly, 
economies may differ not only in their capital labour ratio but also in the 
level of technology, savings rate, depreciation rate or population growth 
rate. In particular, it is important to focus attention on the determinants 
of the steady state. In the augmented version of their model Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992) (henceforth MRW) introduce a standard 
solovian production function augmented by human capital, H: 
 
Y = KαHβ (AL)1−α −β  with 1α β+ <   (7) 
 
The constraints are: 
 
k)gn(ysk k
. δ++−=      (8) 
.
( )hh s y n g hδ= − + +      (8’) 
 
The lowercase letters denote a quantity per unit of effective labour. 
Equations (8) and (8’) are identical: MRW assume the same dynamics for 
both physical and human capital, where sk and sh represent the exogenous 
and constant propensities to invest in both types of capital. Thus, MRW 
assume the same technology for producing human capital as for 
producing physical capital. This is a controversial assumption and has 
been criticised by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997a).10. The steady 
                                                 
9 King and Rebelo (1993). 
10 They produce evidence showing that the technology for producing human capital is 
more intensive in labour than is the technology for producing other goods. Their 
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state values of physical capital, k*, and human capital, h*, are determined 
by: 
 
βαββ
δ
−−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++=
1
1
1
)(
*
gn
ssk hk      (9) 
βααα
δ
−−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++=
1
1
1
)(
*
gn
ss
h hk      (9’) 
 
By augmenting the model with human capital, MRW obtain an 
expression for the steady state (indicated by the asterisk) of per capita 
GDP: 
 
)gnln(
1
sln
1
sln
1
gt)0(Aln
)t(L
)t(Yln hk
*
δβα
βα
βα
β
βα
α ++−−
+−−−+−−++=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡   (10) 
 
Equation (10) states that the steady state level of income per 
effective worker is positively related to the savings (or investment rates) 
of an economy while it is negatively related to parameters n, g and δ . It 
is also positively determined by the parameter A(0) which, as Mankiw 
Romer and Weil (1992) emphasise, represents not only the initial level of 
technology or knowledge, as previously suggested, but also institutions, 
climate and resource endowments. Moreover, the steady state of per 
capita income, in addition to the factors of the Solow’s textbook model 
described in (14), depends on sh, the rate of accumulation of human 
capital. Substituting equation (10) in the usual convergence equation, we 
obtain a positive relationship between the growth rate of an economy 
and the rate of accumulation of human capital.  
Note that this is not the only possible specification of the 
convergence regression. MRW also introduce a specification of the 
convergence regression in which the growth rate of an economy is a 
function of the level of human capital. Nevertheless, this alternative 
specification of the growth process involves per capita income growth as 
a function of the steady state level of human capital. In fact, equation (10) 
can be rewritten as: 
 
                                                                                                         
evidence suggests factor shares of 10%, 40% and 50% for physical capital, human 
capital and raw labour in the production of human capital, as opposed to 30%, 28% 
and 42% shares used by MRW for both sectors. 
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)gnln(
1
*hln
1
sln
1
gt)0(Aln
L
Yln k
*
δβα
α
βα
β
βα
α ++−−−−−+−−++=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡    (10’) 
 
In this case, by substituting equation (10’) within the 
convergence equation, we also find there to be a positive relationship 
between the growth rate of per capita income and the steady state level 
(or stock) of human capital. Note that in their empirical analysis, MRW 
introduce secondary school enrolment rates as a proxy for human 
capital. In other words, they probably consider equation (10) as the most 
appropriate specification of steady state11. In fact, h* should be 
considered unobservable, since in most countries it is implausible to 
assume that the observed human capital is at its steady state level. 12 
Thus, if countries differ in one or more of these parameters, it is 
clear from equation (10) that they will end up in different steady states. 
In the latter case, only for given y* can we say that the growth rate is 
higher the lower y(0), that is, the convergence is conditional in that y(0) 
enters in relation to y*, which may differ across regions. Empirically, this 
means we would expect to observe poor countries growing faster than 
rich ones only if their respective steady state is similar. Yet if, for 
example, rich countries have a higher steady state level of per capita 
income with respect to poorer countries, poor economies will not 
necessarily grow faster.  
The MRW model has been highly influential within the growth-
convergence debate. Theoretically, they have clearly illustrated the 
concept of conditional convergence, emphasizing that the Solow model 
predicts absolute convergence only under very restrictive assumptions. 
In this way, they provide a better description of cross-country data 
compared to the previous unconditional convergence-exogenous growth 
empirical literature, and show that it is not necessary to rely on 
endogenous models to explain the evident divergences among countries 
in international data sets. In their empirical analysis, they test for the 
determinants of the steady state including data on population growth 
                                                 
11 More precisely, during their empirical analysis they assume that actual values of 
human capital stocks represent a good proxy of their steady state value. However they 
never include in their regressions a measure of the stock of human capital arguing for a 
lack of data on that variable. 
12 On this see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997a).  
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rates, savings rates and secondary school enrolment rates13 and find 
evidence of conditional convergence. That is, they do not predict there 
will be convergence in levels of per capita income among countries, 
since economies converge towards different long-run levels of per capita 
income but will converge towards the same long-run exogenous growth rate. 
Moreover, by augmenting the Solow growth model with human capital, 
they predict a larger contribution of total capital to transitional growth, 
and thus predict the existence of a prolonged transitional dynamic 
process. With the inclusion of a human capital indicator in their 
empirical analysis, they also find plausible values for the structural 
parameters of the Solow model14. 
4 Endogenous growth: early divergence, possible 
convergence 
The divergence hypothesis has been explicitly formulated and 
tested in various studies on endogenous growth. As stated above, one of 
the main motivations for further studies in endogenous growth 
literature has certainly been the model’s inadequacy in explaining the 
absence of convergence among countries  Endogenous growth models 
are highly heterogeneous. A simple and unifying definition of the 
endogenous growth models uses their relationship with the Solow 
model: what distinguishes the endogenous growth literature from the 
solovian approach is the possibility of positive long-run growth rates 
without the presence of exogenous technological progress. 
Nevertheless, different models within this literature give quite diverse 
interpretations regarding the engine of long-run growth. 
Following Romer (2001), we distinguish two different classes of 
models within the endogenous growth literature. The first class assumes 
that the process of capital accumulation and, in particular, human capital 
accumulation, is central for explaining long-run growth paths. These 
models differ from Solow’s in that they assume the capital share 
coefficient to be α ≥ 1, that is, they assume that returns to capital are 
constant or increasing. As in MRW, non decreasing returns are usually 
explained by the introduction in the production function of a broad 
                                                 
13 As a proxy for the accumulation of human capital, sh. 
14 In particular, the value of the elasticity of output with respect to total capital, with an 
estimated value of approximately 0.8.  
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concept of capital that may include human capital15. In the second class 
of models, technology is a standard reproducible factor of production. In 
this case the process of accumulation of A is the key factor for 
explaining long-run growth. These studies determine how the technology 
evolves and describe what the possible determinants of innovation will 
be, seen as a distinct economic activity, i.e., they focus on the input A of 
the production function and its evolution over time. However, the 
original contribution of these works is not in their simple emphasis on 
technology. Undoubtedly, even in Solow’s view technological change lies 
at the heart of economic growth since it is the key factor in explaining 
long run growth. Nevertheless, while Solow believes that explaining 
technological progress is still too difficult a task for economic theory, 
and that the exogeneity assumption is the most reasonable one16, this is 
precisely what most endogenous growth models attempt to do. As 
Romer notes (1990), technology or knowledge is a nonrival good but it is 
not necessarily nonexcludable as assumed by Solow. In particular, 
excludability depends on the nature of the knowledge produced and on 
the legal system governing property rights (or patenting and copyrights 
laws). Models assuming that technology shares both of these 
characteristics identify the public support for basic scientific research as 
the driving force for growth. Thus, government decisions become 
important for growth as it is necessary to subsidise the R&D sector. As 
in Solow, technology (or knowledge) is considered to be a purely public 
good, not something that the private sector can provide. Yet here, unlike 
in Solow’s model, long-run growth needs to be sustained. That is, 
technology is never manna from heaven. On the other hand, when 
knowledge created by R&D is excludable, it is possible to obtain 
mechanisms in which expenditure in R&D is motivated by the desire for 
private gain. In this case the developer of new ideas must have some 
degree of market power. Innovators can charge a fee for the use of the 
idea, where the fee is limited by the extent to which others are prepared 
to devote resources to learning the idea17.  
                                                 
15See Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991). 
16 See Solow (1994).  
17Other forces which have raised interest because important for governing the allocation 
of resources to the development of technology include economic incentives and social 
forces influencing the activity of talented individuals and learning by doing. See Romer 
D. (2001). 
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We briefly introduce the Romer’s model (1990) in this survey, as 
it is one of the most influential studies of the new growth literature. Romer 
starts from the premise that technological change lies at the heart of 
economic growth as it is technological change that engenders continued 
capital accumulation. More precisely, the crucial input of production 
necessary for explaining long-run growth is the process of knowledge 
creation in an economy. Although closely linked, knowledge and 
technological progress are not one and the same thing. In particular, 
knowledge can be divided into two components: human capital and 
technology. While the first component cannot grow indefinitely, the 
second one can. This is an explicit criticism levied at the Lucas (1988) 
model, which identifies long-run growth (that grows indefinitely) 
exclusively with the growth of human capital18. For Romer (1990), the 
interesting case is that of a nonrival but not completely excludable good, 
where excludability depends on both the nature of the knowledge itself 
and on economic institutions governing property rights19. The 
consequence of a nonrival good when used as an input of production is 
that output does not have a constant returns to scale function of all 
inputs taken together. Therefore, technology is characterised by 
knowledge spillovers: the discovery of a new technology will not capture 
all the benefits of its investment. As a result, private efforts at 
technological improvements will be less than socially optimal. As an 
example of new technologies, Romer introduces the design of a new 
good: in this case technology is embodied in new capital goods. The idea 
is simple: this model shows that productivity increases because of ideas 
embodied in capital and material inputs. We will briefly introduce a few 
details of the model which describes an economy with four inputs of 
production: capital (K), labour (L), human capital (H) and index of the 
level of technology (A). In this model the final good production function 
may be rewritten as: 
 
                                                 
18 See section 5. 
19 To avoid any confusion, we prefer to distinguish between models that focus on the 
importance of endogenising technological change distinct from capital accumulation 
and models that instead focus on processes of capital deepening. However, there is a 
third class of models that, following Arrow (1961), introduce the possibility that 
accumulation of knowledge occurs in part not as a result of deliberate efforts, but as a 
side effect of conventional economic activity; for example, as a side effect of the 
production of new capital. 
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βαβαβα −−+= 10y KLHqAY      (11) 
 
where )1(q βαη −−−= , a constant. This production function shows 
increasing returns (is homogeneous of degree1 α β+ + ). These are 
caused by the nonrival nature of knowledge, implying knowledge 
spillovers will occur. If we examine the model in the balanced growth 
equilibrium, *g 20. It can be shown that the balanced growth rate is 
determined by: 
 
* ( )
A
Hg H λ α β αρλ αθ β
+ −= = +      (12) 
 
Equation (12) says that the balanced growth rate of an economy 
depends on the amount of human capital allocated in the R&D sector, 
HA. Allocation of human capital in the R&D sector is influenced by the 
interest rate. In this model, the opportunity cost for H to be allocated in 
the R&D sector is the wage that can be earned in the final good sector, 
while the returns to investing HA in the R&D sector are represented by 
the stream of net revenue generated by a new design. A higher interest 
rate leads the present discounted value of the stream of net revenue to 
be lower and thus results in less human capital, HA, being allocated as 
well as a lower growth rate. Contrariwise, a reduction in the interest rate 
should speed up growth. The last equality in (12) represents the 
parametrically expressed balanced growth rate. It shows that H, total 
human capital, enters the growth rate equation and that λ , the research 
success parameter, has a positive effect on g*, while the discount rate, ρ , has a negative effect. Moreover, in (12), g does not represent the 
efficient balanced growth rate because of the presence of a positive 
externality in research. There is a nonexcludable effect of R&D: when a 
new design is invented it increases the productivity of the R&D sector 
and this effect is not considered in the new design’s price. The social 
optimum can be obtained by subsidizing the accumulation of A.  
In terms of the convergence/divergence hypothesis, it must be 
noted that there is no convergence mechanism operating here. If we 
consider two economies, the one with the larger HA will grow faster 
                                                 
20 That is, when *A
*
Y
*
K
*
C gggg === . 
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indefinitely and neither GDP per capita levels nor long-run growth rates 
will converge. Moreover, even if human capital is important in defining 
the dynamics of the growth process it cannot be considered as the 
ultimate source of long-run growth. In order for unbounded per capita 
income to grow indefinitely, we need to identify another unbounded 
input, i.e technological progress. Nevertheless, in this study the long-run 
growth rate of an economy ultimately depends on the stock of human 
capital.  
The influence of Romer’s (1990) model may be gauged by the 
many criticisms and extensions it has received. One of the first common 
criticisms of Romer’s (1990) model within endogenous growth literature 
is that it has a scale effect. Equation (12) implies that a country with a 
larger skilled labour force should grow faster, since technology evolves 
according to the rule, AHA Aλ=
•
, where λ is a research success 
parameter. Human capital is an input into idea production function 
characterised by knowledge spillovers: researchers generate more 
varieties of products (more ideas) the greater the stock of knowledge 
from which to learn. Moreover, there is no uncertainty in the R&D 
sector: Romer assumes that investments would certainly produce 
innovation given an exogenous success parameterλ .21 Thus, this 
assumption implies that the growth of technology should follow the 
same path of human capital over time. In practice, though, this 
prediction is difficult to detect in actual data. This is widely known as the 
Jones (1995) critique and will be dealt with later. 22  
Overall, despite their heterogeneity, all endogenous growth 
models are similar to Romer’s (1990) in that they do not sustain a 
solovian convergence mechanism. Nevertheless, even if this literature 
was at first associated with predicting divergence among economies, 
further developments showed that endogenous models could actually 
                                                 
21 Aghion and Howitt (1992) introduce uncertainty in the R&D sector, where 
uncertainty in the research process implies that the growth rate becomes stochastic. 
22 Moreover, the model does not account for obsolescence of capital goods because it 
assumes additive separability of durables in the final goods production function. That 
is, in Romer, capital goods are horizontally differentiated implying that no one capital 
good is better than the others. This characterisation of the growth process has been 
considered unsatisfactory by advocates of the so-called Schumpeterian approach. See 
Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
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produce convergence with human capital playing an important role in 
generating this mechanism. This point will be further investigated in the 
following sections.  
5 Human Capital and the Lucas Approach  
The so called Lucas approach is characterised by the assumption that the 
role of human capital in a growth model is simply as an additional input 
in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function. Therefore, we identify 
a new input, total capital, which represents the sum of human plus 
physical capital. As usual, the presence of an endogenous or exogenous 
growth mechanism crucially depends on how returns to total capital in 
the production function of this economy are viewed. The presence of 
non-decreasing returns in this augmented form of capital cause, as 
expected, non-decreasing incentive to its accumulation as the stock of 
capital increases. Conversely, if total capital (human plus physical) is 
characterised by decreasing returns, incentives to its accumulation tend 
to decrease with an increase in its stock. In that case, human capital, even 
if it does not explain long-run growth, is still crucial for a better 
understanding of the process of transition towards long-run equilibrium. 
Note that the MRW model examined in section 3 may certainly be 
included in this class of models.  
However, not all these models introduce augmented forms of 
capital. For example, Lucas (1988) assumes non-decreasing returns in the 
accumulation of human capital only, and identifies in this way the 
mechanism that causes the presence of an endogenous growth process. 
Unlike the MRW one, this is an endogenous growth model where 
technological progress and, thus, long-run growth essentially coincides 
with the process of accumulation of human capital, which is assumed to 
be unbounded23, and to determine the long-run growth of an economy. 
He describes an economy where human capital is the key factor of 
production and where the production of human capital does not require 
physical capital: 
 
γ
α
ββ )h()uh(ky 1−=      (13) 
 
                                                 
23 And we have seen that this assumption has been criticised by Romer 
(1990). 
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Differently from MRW, lowercase letters denote variables in per 
capita term; y is the usual GDP, h denotes the human capital stock of the 
representative agent, u is the fraction of time allocated to production and 
ha represents the average human capital stock across individuals. Leisure 
is assumed exogenous and (1-u) denotes the time spent on education24. 
The presence of the parameter 0γ >  implies an externality in the 
model. In this way, Lucas stresses the possibility of the existence of 
“internal” and “external” effects on the accumulation of human capital: 
the former is simply the effect of individual human capital on its own 
productivity while the latter arises from a simple positive externality that 
the average level of human capital has on the productivity of all factors. 
This assumption implies that competitive equilibrium does not equate 
with efficient equilibrium. Therefore, optimal equilibrium will only be 
obtained by the social planner equilibrium. However, as we shall see, the 
presence of an externality in the production function is not essential in 
order to obtain the main results of this model. In this framework, the 
representative agent maximises the standard constant relative risk 
aversion utility function given the constraints: 
 
nkcyk
. −−=       (14) 
.
(1 )h u hξ= −        (14’)  
 
Equations (14) and (14’) show that, unlike MRW, Lucas does 
not assume the same accumulation function for h and k. The parameter 
ξ  in (14’) represents the efficiency of the educational system. Equation 
(14’) is the key one: it implies the presence of a process of endogenous 
growth. Endogenous growth is determined by the presence of constant 
returns to accumulation of the existing stock of human capital. In this 
case, the rate of growth of the stock of human capital plays the same role 
as exogenous technological change does in the Solow model. In fact, the 
Hamiltonian of this problem is25: 
 
                                                 
24 It is possible to relax this assumption. For a version of the Lucas model 
with leisure introduced endogenously see Solow (1994). 
25 Assuming the standard isoelastic utility function. 
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where the first order conditions are determined as usual. Rearranging the 
FOC’s and using the relationship between k and y we obtain: 
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h
*
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where g* denotes the steady state growth rates. It can be shown that: 
 
* 1 ( )
(1 )h
g β δ ρϑ β γ γ
−= −− + −      (17)  
 
Equation (16) is what most interests us here. In this model, the 
per capita income growth rate turns out to be a proportion of the growth 
rate of human capital. In other words, unlike MRW, Lucas endorses the 
idea that the long-run growth of per capita output is driven by the 
accumulation of human capital. Therefore this model predicts divergence 
across countries: economies that invest more in human capital (richer 
economies) should grow faster. That is to say, there is no convergence in 
levels of per capita income among countries because each country 
converges to different long-run growth rates.  
However, in a more recent work, Lucas (1993) modifies this 
model including a convergence in levels mechanism. More precisely, he 
explicitly introduces knowledge spillovers among economies that cause 
the presence of a catching up process.26 In fact, Lucas (1988) can simply 
be modified by introducing two countries, and transforming equation 
(14’) as follows: 
 
µµδ −• −= 12111 hh)u1(h   with 0 1µ< <  (18) 
 
where the subscripts, 1 and 2, represent the two countries. In (18) we still 
have constant returns on human capital for country 1 as before, but in 
                                                 
26 The following example represents a further simplification of the model proposed by 
Lucas (1993) but it is still able to incorporate the catching up mechanism. 
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this case note that 1h
•
 also depends on the level of human capital in 
country 2. More precisely, this equation captures the idea of possible 
interdependencies among economies because it accounts for ideas 
developed in one place affecting the development of new ideas 
elsewhere. In terms of growth rates: 
 
µ
δ
−•
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−=
1
1
2
1
1
1
h
h)u1(
h
h
     (19) 
 
Equation (19) implies that, if u1=u2, and h1>h2, country 2 should grow 
faster until h1=h2. Therefore, this relationship implies convergence in 
both per capita income levels and long-run growth rates between the two 
countries.  
Unlike Lucas (1988) and (1993), the Azariadis and Drazen (1990) model 
introduces the existence of positive threshold externalities in education 
technology that lead to the existence of a multiplicity of equilibria and, 
thus, of steady state growth paths. They describe an overlapping 
generation model that allows economies with identical structures but 
different levels of investment in education to experience sustained 
differences in income per capita growth rates27. Individuals lives can be 
divided into two periods: when young, they inherit the aggregate human 
capital accumulated by previous generations and decide how much time 
to allocate to investing in education, u28, and how much time to allocate 
to production activities, (1-u). 
As in Lucas (1988), the long-run growth rate, g*, is a function of 
investments in human capital and, more specifically, it turns out to be an 
increasing function of the productivity of education. We focus on the 
equation that defines how human capital accumulates during the lifetime 
of an individual: 
 
t,11tt,2 h)u)u(1(h
ϑγ ⋅+= −      (20) 
 
where the subscript 1, denotes the individual when young, 2 
                                                 
27 We will follow a simplified version of this model proposed by Aghion and Howitt 
(1998).  
28 That is, as in Lucas (1988), u represents the fraction of time allocated to education. 
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when old, ϑ is a parameter strictly less than one and γ represents the 
productivity of education and depends on the fraction of time allocated 
to education by the previous generation.  
The existence of multiplicity of equilibria requires that there 
exists a positive threshold externality such that:  
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−
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where u0 defines the threshold level of u. Suppose that the 
previous generation invested a low fraction of his time in education 
such that γγ =− )u( 1t : in this case, investment in education will be 
unattractive for the current generation as well, because private rates of 
return on human capital investment depend on the existing average 
quality of h. Therefore, we will observe “…a tendency to perpetuate the 
successes and failures of the development process29”. This analysis of a 
single economy may be extended to a multiple economies framework. 
In fact, empirically this model implies the existence of convergence 
clubs. If two countries, A and B, have different initial human capital 
endowments where uA<u0 and uB>u0, they will experience indefinite 
growth at different growth rates with g*A<g*B. Without any intervention, 
economies that have not invested sufficiently in education in the past 
will find themselves in a “low development trap”, that is, they will find 
themselves in the “poor countries” club. Moreover, we should observe 
different returns to education for the different clubs, with the rich 
countries club having the highest returns. There are no convergence 
mechanisms or knowledge transfers. Here, differences in actual 
investment rates of human capital should represent the key variable for 
explaining observed internationally divergent patterns of growth. And 
the policy implication is a simple one: in order to change club the 
government should subsidise education so that ut ≥ u0.  
Overall, note that, despite the presence of important differences, these 
models share a common assumption and a common testable prediction. 
First of all, this framework assumes that the process of accumulation of 
                                                 
29 Azariadis and Drazen (1990). 
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human capital is equivalent to that of physical capital. Secondly, all these 
models imply that an increase in human capital endowments positively 
affects an economy’s growth rate. In other words, empirically, we should 
observe that countries with different rates of investment or rates of 
change in human capital grow at different rates. However, it affects the 
long-run growth rate in Lucas and Azariadis and Drazen, while it influences 
the short run growth rate or, more precisely, the growth rate of the 
transitional dynamics in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).  
6 From rates of change to levels: The Nelson and Phelps 
approach 
An alternative approach to growth and education has its roots in 
the contribution of Nelson and Phelps (1966). This literature de-
emphasises the role of capital accumulation (both physical and human) as 
the engine of growth and highlights the importance of the process of 
technological change. Within this framework “the growth rate of output 
will depend on the rate of innovation and, subsequently, on the level of 
human capital”30 and not on the rate of change of human capital as in 
the previous studies31.  
Moreover, the majority of these models stress the importance 
of a catch-up mechanism in which human capital plays a fundamental 
role. In particular, it has the dual role of increasing the rate of 
technological innovations, as well of sustaining the rate of adoption of 
existing technologies. That is, technological improvement is the 
combination of two distinct types of activities, innovation and imitation. 
The first role is generally related to technologically advanced economies 
or economies that may be considered at the technology frontier, and can 
be thought as pure research. The second role identifies a convergence 
mechanism resulting from technology transfers among economies rather 
than from factors accumulation as in the case of solovian convergence 
and, thus, should be important for less developed economies. In this 
case, stocks of human capital increase the capacity to adopt and 
implement innovations or new technologies from more advanced 
countries. Thus, the latter describes the capacity to adopt new 
                                                 
30 Nelson and Phelps (1966). 
31 This assumption may lead us to include the Romer’s (1990) model analysed above 
within the Nelson and Phelps approach. 
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technologies from abroad and demonstrates the possibility of a process 
of beta convergence occurring, that is, of a catch up process, among 
countries. 
Abramovitz (1986) was among the first to develop the idea of 
technological catch up as described above, though in a non-formal 
setting. He shares some ideas with endogenous growth models. Firstly, 
as were early endogenous growth studies, his studies were motivated by 
the search for a pattern in the observed wide variation in cross-country 
growth rates of output per man-hour. Secondly, he criticises the 
solovian approach, since catching up may explain the observed pattern 
of growth, but it does not represent a movement towards a steady state 
trend. Those who lag behind have the potential to experience higher 
growth rates. In particular, as in Nelson and Phelps (1966), the larger 
the technological and, therefore, the productivity gap between leader 
and follower, the stronger the follower's potential for growth in 
productivity. The idea is the often cited one: learning and imitating may 
be cheaper and faster than the original discovery and testing. Therefore, 
the distance between the level of development of the leader and that of 
a follower may be seen in terms of a stock of technological 
opportunities to exploit. Abramovitz distinguishes between potential 
and realised catching up. The former is measured by the gap between 
the leader countries and the backward countries, while realised catching 
up is the rate of exploitation of potential catching up. Actual 
exploitation depends on "the diffusion of knowledge, the rate of 
structural change, the accumulation of capital, and the expansion of the 
demand"32. More precisely, a country should have the social capability or 
the technological congruence to catch up with the leader; these concepts can 
be broadly identified with and explained in terms of technical 
competence, human capital and political, financial and industrial 
institutions. Therefore, in describing social capability determinants, he 
identifies many factors other than human capital. Despite his influence 
within literature on catching up, the limitation of the Abramovitz 
approach has been the absence of a clear theoretical background. Below 
we introduce different models that explain in a formal setting how this 
advantage of backwardness can lead to catch up.  
As in the Solow model, Nelson and Phelps (1966) describe a 
model where it is possible to observe a convergence process. However, 
                                                 
32 Abramovitz (1986). 
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unlike in solovian convergence, this process is not produced by the 
existence of decreasing returns to capital accumulation but rather by the 
presence of knowledge spillovers or technology transfers. In particular, 
the higher the level of human capital and the larger the technology gap 
between the follower and the technology leader, the higher the resulting 
growth rate will be. They introduce the notion of an exogenously given 
theoretical level of technology T. In particular, T(t) can be seen as a 
measure of the stock of knowledge available to innovators, or as the 
technological frontier at time t, where T grows exogenously at a 
constant exponential rate, g. That is, T(t)=T(0)egt, where g>0. The major 
difference between this and the standard Solow model is described by 
the following equation: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
)t(A
)t(A)t(T)H(
)t(A
)t(A
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Φ     (0) 0Φ = ,    ( ) 0H′Φ >  (22) 
 
Equation (22) implies that the growth rate of A, the actual index 
of technology, is an increasing function of H, the level of educational 
attainment, and is also proportional to the gap between the theoretical 
knowledge, T, and A. Equation (22) also implies that the long-run 
growth rate of A is determined by the growth rate of theoretical 
knowledge, g, and that the long-run gap between T and A is determined 
by the level of H. In particular, when an economy has a positive level of 
H (exogenously determined) such that gAA >• , we would observe a 
decreasing gap between T and A that causes a decrease in the current 
growth rate of A during the transition towards the common g. This 
process will continue until the growth rate of A is equal to g. We can 
interpret these results as implying the existence of a short run and a long-
run Solow residual, where the former is influenced by the level of human 
capital while the latter is, as in Solow, exogenously determined. The 
Figure above describes this dynamic. 
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Thus, given H, in steady state the economy will grow at the rate 
g and will retain a constant gap between the theoretical knowledge and 
its actual level of technology where the equilibrium gap is given by 
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g
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a
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where Aa represents actual technology. 
Equation (23) implies that the gap between T and A can be 
eventually reduced to zero by an increase in H, the human capital stock. 
Therefore, in terms of the convergence in levels prediction, the Nelson 
and Phelps model could be collocated within the conditional 
convergence literature. However, in this case the transitional dynamics 
at work constitute an explicit catching up process where the level of 
human capital plays the key role in defining the long-run gap that 
separates one country from the highest level of per capita income 
attainable.  
7 The Nelson and Phelps approach: endogenous models 
Even if, in comparison with Solow, the Nelson and Phelps model 
represents a richer framework for understanding the role of technology 
and human capital within the growth process, ultimately, as in Solow, 
the long-run growth rate of technical progress is still exogenous. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) extend this framework considering 
technological progress to be endogenously determined. Therefore, they 
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stress the endogenous nature of growth and technical progress, 
introducing a model in which a higher level of human capital, H, causes 
a higher long-run growth rate of technical progress, where H is 
exogenously given. In particular, they extend the Nelson and Phelps 
model (hereafter NP) assuming an explicit process of diffusion of 
technology among countries. More precisely, following Nelson and 
Phelps (1966), they explicitly interpret T, the theoretical level of 
knowledge, as the technology level of a leading economy. The main 
difference with the Nelson and Phelps model is illustrated by the 
following equation: 
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As in equation (22), equation (24) represents the growth of total 
factor productivity for country i. Both f(Hi) and c(Hi) are non-decreasing 
functions of Hi. Thus, the growth rate of technology for a follower is 
given by two elements: the endogenous growth rate f(Hi) plus a catch-up 
factor. The leader will grow at the rate f(HL), that is 
A t A eL
f H tL( ) ( ) ( )= 0 . This hypothesis represents the crucial 
difference with the previous model. In NP f(Hi)=0, where this 
assumption implies that Hi affects the growth rate of Ai only in 
transition. In this case, the more human capital is allocated to the R&D 
sector the better it will be for long-run growth. As a consequence, the 
dynamics among countries are here more complex, and the convergence 
to a common growth rate may be an extremely long process33. Despite 
the differences, both the NP model and the Benhabib and Spiegel 
(hereafter BS) model share the same conclusions. First, if a group of 
economies shares the same level of human capital we should in the 
long-run observe complete convergence in both per capita income and 
growth rates. Secondly, if we assume that Hi remain constant in each 
country (or that the ranking of Hi does not change across countries over 
time) the mechanism of technology diffusion and catch-up will at least 
guarantee convergence in growth rates: all countries eventually grow at 
the same rate as the leader, the latter acting as the locomotive. Their 
contribution is also of an empirical kind. In particular, their study was 
                                                 
33 This is true if, for example, we assume that f(Hi)>c(Hi). 
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one of the first attempts to estimate the NP approach and to distinguish 
between what they call the neoclassical convergence effect and catch-up 
due to technological transfers.  
In a more recent paper, Benhabib and Spiegel (2002) examine 
an alternative formulation that introduces a mechanism whereby the rate 
of technological diffusion decreases as the distance to the leader 
increases. A logistic model of technology diffusion is given by: 
 
. max ( )( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 1
( ) ( )
jj
i i
i
A tA t f H t c H t
A t A t
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  or 
 
. max ( )( )( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) 1
( ) max ( ) ( )
jji
i i
j ij
A tA tA t f H t c H t
A t A t A t
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (25) 
 
The difference between eq. (24) (defined as the exponential 
model of technology diffusion) and this logistic model is the term 
( )
max ( )
i
jj
A t
A t
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. In this formulation, the second term of the RHS includes 
two contrasting mechanisms. The first is the standard catch-up 
mechanism, but the extra term acts in an opposite direction since the 
positive contribution of human capital to TFP growth tends to be 
smaller, the greater the distance between the leader and the follower. 
This implies that the usual catching-up mechanism is therefore more 
effective at intermediate distances from the leader, while is less effective 
for both very laggard and advanced countries. Therefore, the logistic 
model further stresses the importance of investments in human capital: 
countries with a very low level of human capital may become unable 
even to exploit their advantage of backwardness and risk being “trapped 
in the wrong club”. That is, this model identifies an explicit ‘club 
convergence’ mechanism. Assuming that the ranking of Hi does not 
change across countries and over time it is possible to show that if a 
country i has ( ) ( ) ( ) 0i i leaderc H f H f H+ − >  then this country will 
converge in growth rates with the leader, while if 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0i i leaderc H f H f H+ − <  growth rates diverge, and the laggard 
country will continue to further distance itself from the leader.  
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Again, in their study BS make an interesting empirical 
contribution. In general, the empirical literature on convergence clubs 
has probably not evolved pari passu with its theoretical developments. 
Evidence of divergence and, in particular, “twin peaks” evidence in 
cross country analysis that use the income distribution dynamics 
methodology developed by Quah34, is certainly consistent with the club 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, there are very few attempts to estimate what is 
one of the main implications of these models, which is the presence of 
thresholds that cause a country to settle in either the poor or rich 
countries club. As observed by Azariadis and Drazen (1990) for their 
“…model to have sharp predictions, one would need to know the 
location of such human capital thresholds…and if they differ across 
economies”.35. Unlike Azariadis and Drazen, they use empirical analysis 
to derive a point estimate for the minimum initial human capital level 
necessary for a country to exhibit catch-up in TFP relative to the leader 
economy.  
Finally, we conclude this introduction to the NP approach with 
the Jones (1995) critique. Jones observes that the NP approach, and 
Romer’s (1990) may be included in this framework, implies 
counterfactual predictions. With the exception of BS(2002), in this 
approach the growth rate of A, an index of technology, is an increasing 
function of H, the level of educational attainment. Thus, we should 
observe in actual data that increased research effort causes an increase in 
the growth rate. But this is not the case. In most developed countries 
human capital and research effort have increased continuously in the 
last decades but these countries did not experience accelerating growth 
rates. Thus, to reconcile theory with data it is necessary to assume some 
form of decreasing returns in the R&D sector, with new discoveries 
becoming increasingly hard as the stock of existing knowledge (or 
human capital) increases. Otherwise, as noted by Cannon (2000), to be 
consistent with the stylised facts concerning human capital, the 
relationship linking technology to human capital should be modified. 
The growth rate of A should be an increasing function of the human 
                                                 
34 See Quah (1996), (1997) and (1999). 
35 And they conclude that “In the absence of such information, the working hypothesis 
that emerges is that economic growth should be correlated with human investments 
relative to per capita income”. 
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capital to output ratio36 with an “augmented Nelson-Phelps approach” 
characterised by 
.
( )
( )
A t H
A t Y
γ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , where γ  is some function with a 
positive first derivative. However, in this case it becomes impossible to 
distinguish this augmented NP approach from Lucas, as Cannon shows 
that the Lucas approach implies an identical relationship between A and 
H/Y unless we assume that there is no variation in the ratio of human 
capital to output. But this, again, seems a counterfactual assumption.  
 8 Human capital, catch up and openness to trade 
The models reviewed above describe a catch up mechanism 
resulting from technology transfers with human capital levels acting as 
the main determinant. However, these models do not describe any 
mechanisms that may affect the existence of transfers of technology 
among countries. In the models analysed so far, with the possible 
exception of BS (2002), where human capital needs to exceed a certain 
threshold for catch up to take place, transfers of technology and catch 
up are considered as inevitable or automatic. In contrast to this 
approach, other studies focus specifically on the possible existence of 
barriers to the adoption of technology from abroad. Quoting Parente 
and Prescott (2000): “The relevant question is: Why don’t poor 
countries use the existing stock of usable technology more efficiently?” 
37 Many factors have been identified as important for a country to be 
able to imitate and implement new technologies from abroad. We saw in 
section 6 how Abramovitz (1986) distinguishes between potential and 
realised catching up and how the latter depends on the social capability of 
a country identified with its technical competence, human capital as well 
as the structure of its political, financial and industrial institutions. 
Parente and Prescott [(1994) and (2000)] have further developed this 
idea. They focus in particular on the existence of barriers to the 
adoption and efficient use of more productive technologies, where such 
barriers are the primary result of country-specific policies. Aghion, 
                                                 
36 See Segestrom (1998) and Howitt (1999). 
37“ …This is why the focus of the book is on barriers to the adoption and efficient use 
of more productive technologies, and not on the creation of more productive 
technologies.” Parente and Prescott (2000) page 5. 
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Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2003) focus on the effect of financial 
development on convergence and examine how financial constraints 
may prevent countries from taking full advantage of technology transfer. 
However, among the factors influencing technology diffusion, 
trade policies have been identified as one of the main determinants, 
since they are a sort of necessary vehicle for technological spillovers to 
take place38. For Abramovitz (1986), trade helps to explain why we 
observe catching up among western economies. He identifies the years 
following World War II as an exceptional period, where many of the 
elements required for rapid growth and catching up came together. 
There was a group of countries with similar economies, large 
technological gaps but with a relatively (highly) educated labour force 
that opened them to trade. In general, theoretical models have identified 
different positive channels through which trade affects an economy’s 
productivity39. Firstly, the larger variety of products and intermediate 
capital goods available to an open economy may enhance its 
productivity. Secondly, trade is usually associated with cross-border 
learning of a) new product designs, b) new production and 
organisational methods and c) market conditions. In other words, we 
can think of technology transfers as taking place directly through flows 
of ideas or indirectly through flows of goods, where both are enhanced 
by trade-friendly policies. All these factors increase the efficiency with 
which domestic resources are allocated, and enable a laggard economy 
to learn and imitate foreign technologies. Thus, trade-induced 
technology transfers may lead to cross-country convergence. However, 
the standard international trade literature stresses also another effect of 
trade. In fact, in a multi-sector framework, trade may induce a country 
to specialise and, thus, allocate its factors of production to specific 
sectors, determined by its comparative advantages. As we shall see later, 
if different sectors have different growth potential, this allocation effect 
may induce divergence instead of convergence.  
The idea that trade is both 1) a necessary vehicle for 
                                                 
38 Empirical evidence of the presence of R&D spillovers through trade among different 
countries may be found in Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman and 
Hoffmaister (1997). More recently, the positive role played by trade in the adoption of 
new technologies is also stressed in Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1999) and 
Comin and Hobijn (2003) among others.  
39 See also the discussion in Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997).  
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technological spillovers that bring about convergence and 2) a possible 
cause of divergence due to the specialisation induced by the working of 
the law of comparative advantage, was the subject of a study by Rivera 
Batiz and Romer (1991). They looked in particular at how two 
economies interact through trade and investigate the possible effects of 
competition, market size and trade policy on both long-run growth rates 
and steady state levels of per capita income. Human capital factors are 
of fundamental importance in explaining both the long-run growth rate 
as well as convergence. Countries will only converge towards the same 
level of per capita income if they have the same stock of human capital 
allocated to the R&D sector. Within this framework, we explicitly 
consider two different countries (1), home country, and (2), foreign 
country and their interactions through trade. If we extend the nonrival 
nature of technology to this two country-two sector case40 we should 
observe the presence of increasing returns due to international 
knowledge spillovers. We focus here on the so-called knowledge driven41 
specification of the R&D process that represents a simple extension of 
Romer (1990) to open economies42. Moreover, we assume that 
countries are identical, that is, they have similar endowments and 
technologies. This assumption is essential since we need not be 
concerned with the “comparative advantage” effect that would arise in a 
multi-sector trade model and can thus focus on the pure scale effect of 
trade. Countries produce only one final good by means of raw labour, 
human capital and the stock of capital. To examine the main features of 
this model we focus on the R&D sector. In autarchy technology for 
both countries evolves according to the rule, 
i
i i
AA H Aλ
• = , with i=1,2, 
and λ , the research success parameter, is assumed constant between 
                                                 
40 As shown in section 1.3, Romer’s model (1990) can be reduced to a two-sector model, 
where the manufacturing sector includes both the final good sector and an 
intermediate good sector. 
41 We find similar conclusions with the so called lab-equipment specification of the 
R&D process. In this specification of the model it is not necessary to observe a free 
flow of ideas for catching up to take place. It is sufficient that there be of free trade of 
goods. See Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991). 
42 The description of the structure of production technology in the manufacturing sector 
is based on equations (15), (16), (17), while (19) describes the structure of production 
technology in the manufacturing sector in both countries. 
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countries. After trade this process is characterised differently. Rivera 
Batiz and Romer (1991) distinguish two possibilities: 1) free trade of 
goods with no flows of ideas and 2) free trade of goods and ideas. The 
first case implies there will be a level effect of trade. In fact, given this 
view of technology, growth rates are not affected by trade. However, 
free trade of goods implies that the number of machines used in each 
country approaches twice the number that have been produced 
domestically since in their pursuit of monopoly rents, researchers in 
both countries will avoid redundancies. Therefore, trade affects the level 
of output produced in both countries but does not have any effect on 
growth rates. 
In contrast to the previous case, the second case involves a 
growth effect. In particular, if we define Aworld=A1+A2, free flows of 
ideas imply: 
 
.
1 1 world
AA H Aλ=  and 
.
2 2 world
AA H Aλ=   (26) 
 
In this case the rate of growth of new ideas in each country 
depends not only on the human capital allocated to the R&D sector, 
H1A and H2A, as before, but also on Aworld, which represents the sum of 
the stock of knowledge of both countries. In other words, the entire 
stock of knowledge can be used in both countries43 at the same time. 
But, if economies are identical then 2worldA A= . Therefore, eq. (26) 
implies the presence of knowledge spillovers and, as described, the 
R&D sector is characterised by the presence of a scale effect. 
Integration immediately raises the long-run growth rates of these 
countries, purely because it increases the extent of the market. In fact, 
economic integration with knowledge spillovers improves the efficiency 
of the research sector. In autarchy, we would observe redundant efforts, 
with one economy devoting resources to discovering a design that 
already exists in the other country. Finally, note that, in the long run 
growth rates will be equal in both countries as the technology growth 
rate may be rewritten as: 
 ( )1 1 21 1 2
1 1
1AA A
H A A Ag H
A A
λ λ+ ⎛ ⎞= = +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠    (27) 
                                                 
43 And also in both sectors.  
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As in the Lucas (1993) model (equation (19)) the presence of the 
ratio of 2A  to 1A  on the RHS in (27) implies that the free flow of 
ideas/technology would finally equate the long run growth rates in both 
countries.  
However, Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991) develop other 
interesting cases that imply different results. In particular, when 
countries are not similar, there is another possible effect of trade 
liberalisation to consider, i.e. the so-called allocation effect. This effect 
may explain how specialisation creates persistent growth differentials 
and, thus, shows when interaction among countries is not beneficial. As 
stated above, trade can also influence the allocation of human capital 
among sectors, thus affecting a country’s pattern of growth. The idea is 
a simple one. Trade may strongly affects the reallocation of inputs of 
production between sectors on the grounds of comparative advantage. 
In these models, comparative advantage can be determined by different 
initial conditions. Therefore, the flow of goods that follows from the 
opening to trade could induce an increase in specialisation and the 
presence of increasing returns with specialised inputs in the 
manufacturing sector. In this case, we can hypothesise two different 
scenarios. Firstly, if trade causes HA to expand as a result of increased 
specialisation, assuming the absence of knowledge spillovers among 
sectors, the allocation effect increases the long-run rate of growth of 
one country. Conversely, the allocation effect has a negative influence 
on growth in the other trade partner, because trade causes HA to fall. In 
other words, the different allocation of basic inputs between the two 
sectors affects sectoral output which in turn affects long-run growth. In 
conclusion, it is only in the absence of the allocation effect, that the 
scale may turn out to be the source of large dynamic gains, uniformly 
distributed among countries with similar economic structures. Therefore 
policy implications in this case are not so simple. A country should open 
to trade only if the resulting allocation effects are small, and this will be 
true only if trade occurs among similar countries. Note that this model 
assumes absence of spillovers across different sectors. In this case, we 
may even observe two countries converging to different steady state 
levels of per capita income but towards the same long-run growth rate. 
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When trading partners have different initial conditions, Lucas (1988)44, 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Young (1991) show the conditions 
under which comparative advantage produces large allocation effects 
and growth can be larger under autarchy.  
9 Different notions of convergence and predictions of 
exogenous and endogenous models  
The previous analysis stresses as within the growth literature there is no 
single concept of convergence and each possible concept of convergence 
is associated to dissimilar patterns. To clarify this question, we will try to 
summarise some of the differences below45. Among exogenous models, 
we have seen that in his influential studies Solow was probably more 
interested in the analysis of within country convergence than in its across 
countries dimension. The concept of within country convergence should 
actually relate to the transitional dynamics of the solovian model, where 
each economy converges towards its dynamically stable equilibrium 
whatever its initial condition. In other words, each economy inevitably 
converges towards its long-run equilibrium. At first, the notion of within 
country convergence was associated with the concept of across country 
convergence. Indeed, if a group of economies share the same long-run 
equilibrium we should observe poor countries catching up with the 
richer ones. We have called this hypothesis unconditional or absolute 
convergence hypothesis. However, later developments showed that the 
presence of within country convergence will not necessarily mean that 
across country convergence will take place.  
The conditional convergence literature demonstrates that there is not 
necessarily a unique equilibrium among countries, since each country 
tends to converge to its own equilibrium level of income. In particular, 
this hypothesis assumes that, across countries, convergence is valid only 
if factors affecting the long-run equilibrium are the same. Note then that, 
despite the possibility of different steady states, the conditional 
convergence hypothesis assumes that each country converges towards its 
own unique equilibrium. This specification is important if we want to 
                                                 
44 We are not referring to the model described in section 2.1 but to a second model 
always described in Lucas (1988).  
45 See Islam (2003) for a survey of the different concepts of convergence that may be 
found in empirical studies.. 
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distinguish the concept of conditional convergence from the notion of 
convergence clubs. In fact, the two concepts are often assumed to carry the 
same meaning. Nevertheless, there is another possible interpretation, 
where, unlike conditional convergence, the convergence clubs hypothesis 
implies the possibility of the existence of multiple equilibria for each 
country. 
Further, it is important to distinguish between convergence in growth 
rates versus convergence in levels. In general, we have seen that both the 
concepts of conditional and unconditional convergence imply that, in the 
long-run, each country converges towards the same, exogenously given 
growth rate. Therefore, it is sometimes said that conditional convergence 
models entail convergence in steady state growth rates of per capita income, 
while they do not assume convergence in steady state levels of income.  
Finally, the sections above show endogenous growth models 
characterised by both divergence and catch up. Divergence implies that each 
country converges towards its own long-run level of income and its own 
long-run growth rate. Conversely, the catch up hypothesis implies 
convergence in levels and growth rates but must be distinguished from 
standard solovian convergence, since the first is due to technology 
transfers while the latter to capital accumulation.  
In other words, a process of convergence in steady state levels across 
countries may be due to these different mechanism:  
1. Convergence due to capital accumulation; 
2. Convergence due to technology transfers (catch up); 
3. Convergence due to both (1) and (2). 
Conversely, evidence of the absence of convergence in steady state levels 
across countries may be theoretically explained by models implying: 
• Divergence (or absence of convergence in both steady state 
levels and growth rates across countries); 
• Conditional convergence (with the presence of convergence in 
steady state growth rates across countries); 
• Convergence clubs (with the presence of convergence towards 
different steady state growth rates depending on the club). 
 
Moreover, this survey shows as the prediction of 
convergence/divergence in both exogenous and endogenous growth 
models depends on initial assumptions since the same model may 
describe both mechanisms. In particular, it shows that many growth 
models could actually produce convergence or divergence with human 
  36
capital playing an important role in generating these mechanisms.  
For example, in exogenous models, assuming countries share the 
same technology, preferences and human capital steady state levels (and 
possibly, other determinants of the steady state) the transitional 
dynamics of the solovian model imply convergence will occur. 
Conversely, when countries are dissimilar, the Solow model predicts 
conditional convergence, since in this case transitional dynamics cause 
different countries to converge towards different steady state levels. A 
similar mechanism may be found in Nelson and Phelps (1966): assuming 
countries have the same stock of human capital, these models predict 
convergence due to technology catch up. Conversely, when countries 
have different human capital endowments, this model implies what we 
have called conditional catching up: laggard countries still enjoy the 
advantage of backwardness and still converge towards the same 
(exogenously given) long-run growth rate, but they never reach the 
steady state level of per capita income of the most technologically 
advanced economies. 
Within endogenous literature, models are more complex and the 
classification becomes more puzzling. In general, endogenous growth 
studies suggesting the possibility of convergence in per capita levels of 
GDP among different countries usually assume the existence of 
knowledge spillovers from rich to poor countries that eventually generate 
a catching up process. Moreover, to be able to explain convergence, 
these models need to assume that different countries are somehow 
“similar”. In particular, many models assume that we would only observe 
convergence (and also convergence in growth rates) when different 
countries share the same stock of human capital. In other words, when 
countries are not similar, these models predict divergence.  
10 Summary 
Among the determinants of the growth and convergence 
processes identified by the theoretical literature, human capital is 
certainly one of the most important. This paper offers a selective survey 
of the more recent contributions of the theory of human capital and 
growth. In particular, our aim is to provide the necessary link between 
the theory on growth, convergence and human capital and the empirics 
of convergence. Summarising with a play on words, we might conclude 
that during the last fifteen years there has been a convergence of ideas 
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between endogenous and exogenous models with respect to the 
convergence hypothesis where human capital plays an important role. 
Despite the still theoretically important difference between models that 
assume exogenous versus models that assume endogenous long-run 
growth rates, both theories predict that a mechanism of convergence is 
possible, but it will only be so among similar economies. In particular, 
most theoretical literature assumes that similar levels of human capital 
are fundamental for catch up to take place. Therefore, both theories are 
currently able to explain a stylised fact of the empirical literature on 
growth, namely the observed convergence among groups of 
homogeneous countries and the absence of convergence when large and 
heterogeneous data sets are introduced. This observation explains why, 
with current econometric techniques, it is not possible to discriminate 
endogenous versus exogenous models by simply using a convergence 
regression.  
In other words, given these theoretical developments, simple 
convergence tests cannot be considered fully supportive of one theory 
against the other. However, this conclusion does not imply that empirical 
investigations on convergence across economies have become an 
uninteresting issue in growth literature. It implies rather that this 
literature is now called to new challenges as the three fundamental 
questions of any convergence analysis “Are poor countries catching up 
with the richer ones? How quickly? And, ultimately, what are the 
determinants of this process?” are of primary importance for human 
welfare and, thus, undoubtedly represent crucial issues for growth 
economists. In spite of their importance, clear-cut answers are not 
available yet in the literature. 
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